The issue of transtemporal identity is one which, much like other important and interesting domains of philosophy, is a highly controversial subject. While two putative models for explaining transtemporal identity have been put forward, the 3-D theory (endurantism) and the 4-D theory (perdurantism), both models have weaknesses that are exploited by theorists of the opposing camp. The exploitations of these problems are of particular value, however, as they raise or cast new light on related, similarly important metaphysical questions. From the onset of the debate, 3-D theory is often attributed with a somewhat large advantage over 4-D theory in that it has the privilege of most closely matching the average person’s pre-philosophical ideas of transtemporal identity; those that attribute this advantage to 3-D theory are thus enabled to place the burden of proof on the side of 4-D theorists for the debate. In other words, if the perdurantists want to depose the endurantists, they must provide a good deal of argumentation in order to convince philosophers of the merits of 4-D theory and of critical flaws in 3-D theory. It is to this end that the perdurantist opponents of 3-D theory probe and pry in order to find logical breaches in the endurantist works; they seek to subtly force philosophers to abandon pre-philosophical common sense and accept an otherwise counter-intuitive explanation for transtemporal identity. Perhaps one of the more damaging attacks on endurantism comes from Mark Heller, in the form of an argument that supposedly leads endurantist theory to lead necessarily to a logical contradiction.