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Contest CLOSED: contest: write a story! (10 BP)

Call Me Diego

Avatar: 41721 2010-01-14 23:10:10 -0500
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[Good Omens]

Level 69 Emo Kid

Boo!

This thread is gold.

Big Brother

Avatar: 45759 Fri Oct 17 23:44:23 -0400 2008

Level 66 Troll

woman's genitals

Once there was a chicken and a duck. The chicken said “Would you like to know the definition of irony?” The duck said “Sure!” So the chicken said “Look it up in the dictionary!”

The duck went to the dictionary. He found the right page. The book slammed shut on his wing.

So the chicken went to the duck and said “Here is a story that could help you understand.” And he started.

“There was once a race of aliens called Ironians. They were odd because whenever they weren’t on a planet, they moved so slowly that what they thought was two seconds was really one million years.”

“One said to the other, ‘I’m hungry. Lets eat someone,’ and the other agreed. So they went down to Earth and met some cavemen. They asked a caveman who they worshipped and the caveman said “Ug.”

They came back in modern times and said “I am the great and powerful UG!” They got laughed in the face. Except they didn’t have faces, so it was impossible, so the universe blew up.”

The duck said “What does that have to do with irony?” and the chicken replied “Well- Hey! Chickens and ducks can’t talk! It’s impossible!”

So the universe blew up.

Except it didn’t.

Because it couldn’t.

Why?

I don’t know. But I do know the difference between a typewriter. They both have a 42.

Come to think of it, the universe did blow up.

Why?

I don’t know. But I do know the difference between a 42. They both have a typewriter.

Why? I’m not a 42ologist. That is a person who studies the behavior of 42s.

Why?

I don’t know. But I am a Kronkzotoligist. Kronkzot blew up with the rest of the universe.

So there is nothing to study about.

So there is not effort.

So everyone is a Kronkzotoligist.

Fortunately, I have salvaged the last Kronkzot. Here it is.

The End

Doctor Who

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Level 6 Re-Re

Big Brother Posted:

Once there was a chicken and a duck. The chicken said “Would you like to know the definition of irony?” The duck said “Sure!” So the chicken said “Look it up in the dictionary!”

The duck went to the dictionary. He found the right page. The book slammed shut on his wing.

So the chicken went to the duck and said “Here is a story that could help you understand.” And he started.

“There was once a race of aliens called Ironians. They were odd because whenever they weren’t on a planet, they moved so slowly that what they thought was two seconds was really one million years.”

“One said to the other, ‘I’m hungry. Lets eat someone,’ and the other agreed. So they went down to Earth and met some cavemen. They asked a caveman who they worshipped and the caveman said “Ug.”

They came back in modern times and said “I am the great and powerful UG!” They got laughed in the face. Except they didn’t have faces, so it was impossible, so the universe blew up.”

The duck said “What does that have to do with irony?” and the chicken replied “Well- Hey! Chickens and ducks can’t talk! It’s impossible!”

So the universe blew up.

Except it didn’t.

Because it couldn’t.

Why?

I don’t know. But I do know the difference between a typewriter. They both have a 42.

Come to think of it, the universe did blow up.

Why?

I don’t know. But I do know the difference between a 42. They both have a typewriter.

Why? I’m not a 42ologist. That is a person who studies the behavior of 42s.

Why?

I don’t know. But I am a Kronkzotoligist. Kronkzot blew up with the rest of the universe.

So there is nothing to study about.

So there is not effort.

So everyone is a Kronkzotoligist.

Fortunately, I have salvaged the last Kronkzot. Here it is.

The End

You just succinctly soiled Douglas Adam’s work and writing in general in one foul story. Great job, mate!

UnstoppableC-
han

Avatar: 43381 Sat Jun 27 00:58:41 -0400 2009
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Level 35 Troll

“Problem Child IV”

At least he did it succinctly.

Doctor Who

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Level 6 Re-Re

Nonetheless, it is soiled. Beyond repair.

Big Brother

Avatar: 45759 Fri Oct 17 23:44:23 -0400 2008

Level 66 Troll

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How do you soil something beyond repair? The only way I can imagine that happening is if one constructed a club from soil and hit something with it.

Doctor Who

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Big Brother Posted:

How do you soil something beyond repair? The only way I can imagine that happening is if one constructed a club from soil and hit something with it.

I am not sure exactly who you are, but you are incredibly stupid.

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The issue of transtemporal identity is one which, much like other important and interesting domains of philosophy, is a highly controversial subject. While two putative models for explaining transtemporal identity have been put forward, the 3-D theory (endurantism) and the 4-D theory (perdurantism), both models have weaknesses that are exploited by theorists of the opposing camp. The exploitations of these problems are of particular value, however, as they raise or cast new light on related, similarly important metaphysical questions. From the onset of the debate, 3-D theory is often attributed with a somewhat large advantage over 4-D theory in that it has the privilege of most closely matching the average person’s pre-philosophical ideas of transtemporal identity; those that attribute this advantage to 3-D theory are thus enabled to place the burden of proof on the side of 4-D theorists for the debate. In other words, if the perdurantists want to depose the endurantists, they must provide a good deal of argumentation in order to convince philosophers of the merits of 4-D theory and of critical flaws in 3-D theory. It is to this end that the perdurantist opponents of 3-D theory probe and pry in order to find logical breaches in the endurantist works; they seek to subtly force philosophers to abandon pre-philosophical common sense and accept an otherwise counter-intuitive explanation for transtemporal identity. Perhaps one of the more damaging attacks on endurantism comes from Mark Heller, in the form of an argument that supposedly leads endurantist theory to lead necessarily to a logical contradiction.

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Before explicating the thrust of Heller’s attack on endurantism, it is important to first lay out the stakes for the debate at hand, as understood by Heller. According to Heller, holding onto endurantist theory leads one to at least one of a number of unpleasant alternatives, namely the following:

Log in to see images! There is no such thing as my body

Log in to see images! There is no physical object in the space that we would typically say is now exactly occupied by all of me other than my left hand

(C) No physical object can undergo a loss of parts

(D) There can be distinct physical objects exactly occupying the same space at the same time

(E) Identity is not transitive (Heller, 329)

The gravity of the stakes at hand seems readily apparent at the first glance, so if one is to take the stakes seriously, one must carefully analyze the arguments presented by Heller to determine what consequences will follow. Of particular interest will be alternatives Log in to see images! and©, (D) then appears to be a truly undesirable outcome.

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Alternative (E) also is understood to be undesirable, but in a different sense than Log in to see images!, (C), and (D) are. Alternative (E) may seem to be less immediately striking as it does not initially bear any sort of pre-philosophical context, but the transitivity of identity is one of the three core principles of identity conditions (along with symmetry and reflexivity) which are widely held, so if one is forced by Heller to abandon this notion as endurantists, it may become ingreat timesbent upon one to carefully and critically reconsider perdurantism and endurantism once more.

As a last issue to touch upon before exploring Heller’s actual argument, I wish to propose that alternative Log in to see images! to be a non-problematic outcome.

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Now, given the stakes, Heller’s argument goes as follows; if one is to reject the truth of the undesirable alternatives Log in to see images! through (E) and still maintain the truth of three-dimensional theory, one is necessarily lead to a logical contradiction. The premises that the Heller’s argument is based upon follow, as presented and simplified by Michael Loux: Given the entity Descartes at time t1, which is a fully intact Descartes, and Descartes(-) at time t1, which is all of Descartes minus his left hand, and given that at a certain time t2, Descartes had his left hand amputated, the following must be true.

(I) Descartes at t1 is numerically identical with Descartes at t2, based on the belief that a person can survive an amputation as the same person.

(II) Descartes(-) at t1 is numerically identical with Descartes(-) at t2, based on the fact that nothing happened to Descartes(-).

(III) Descartes at t2 is numerically identical with Descartes(-) at t2, based on the fact that both are composed of exactly the same matter and occupy exactly the same space.

(IV) Descartes(-) at t1 is numerically identical with Descartes at t1, based on the transitivity of identity.

However:

(V) Descartes(-) at t1 is not numerically identical with Descartes at t1 by the

true Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. (Loux, 238-240)

Thus, on Heller’s account, the endurantist must accept the truth of (I) through (III) as they are all based on simple principles of numerical identity, and given these premises, (IV) must be true by the transitivity of identity, which as mentioned above, is one of the three main principles of identity conditions. However, (V) is necessarily true also, because Descartes and Descartes(-) are different, distinct objects that have different shapes, mbumes, etc. It is thus that one finds that finishes Heller’s trap is complete, and apparently forces the endurantist into admission of believing contradictory truths, or abandonment of previously held views.

How then does Heller seek to avoid the contradiction? It is not immediately clear that perdurantism provides a suitable answer to the problem at hand, and it would certainly be problematic if Heller’s argument defeated both theories. According to the perdurantists, Neither (I) nor (II) must be held to be necessarily true, because Descartes and Descartes(-) are separate, distinct space-time worms. Descartes at t1 is not numerically identical to Descartes at t2 because both instances of Descartes are specific, different time slices from the aggregate whole of the Descartes space-time worm. As Loux explains it:

As perdurantists see things, Descartes is an aggregate if temporal parts; and his persistence over time is a matter of his having different temporal parts existing at different times. Descartes [at t1] and Descartes [at t2] are just such temporal parts. On the perdurantists’ view, then, Descartes’ making it through the amputation does not involve the numerical identity of Descartes [at t1] and Descartes [at t2]; it involves their standing in the weaker relation of being parts of a single space-time worm. (240)

The same holds true in the case of the temporally distinct Descartes(-) instances. That which guarantees sameness of personhood, the perdurantists claim, is simply that the two Descartes time slices are a part of the same space-time worm, different points on the 4-D axes of Descartes lifespan. To explain the overlap between Descartes and Descartes(-), the perdurantists claim that the two distinct space-time worms merge at t2 with no problems whatsoever. By thus avoiding premises (1) and (2), the perdurantist is capable of escaping the contradiction by simply not worrying about numerical identity.

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The perdurantist escape from the problem is, however, somewhat problematic in and of itself. The first major problem I wish to address with the perdurantist view is that, like arguments that Dualists might put forward, it entails the inclusion of entities into one’s ontology that are in violation of the empiricist principle; the space-time worm is not an object that is ever wholly present at any given time, and the human perceptive faculties can only directly experience three dimensions. If the perdurantist wants to argue that all that is present of an object at any given time is a four dimensional time slice, I posit that they cannot hold that there is any object continuity and simultaneously hold that they follow the empiricist principle, as the time slices, and not the space-time worm, are what are presented to our perceptive faculties and are what we experience. Again, it seems, Ockham’s Razor may be invoked in the culling of the extra ontological load that perdurantism requires; however even if this is not the case, perdurantism is far from saved.

Another particularly vexing problem that arises, if the perdurantists want to allow space-time worm fusion or merging, is that they can hardly hope to argue for transtemporal identity; for it seems that there is nothing precluding an infinite number of space worms replacing one another on a continuous timescale. The scheme I have in mind to elucidate the matter is one in which I perceive a time slice of an object’s space-time worm at one time, and then at in an immediately subsequent time I perceive an otherwise spatially identical time slice of a separate, distinct space-time worm (it is worth noting that this paradigm can operate even under an infinitesimally small amount of time has pbumed). I am certain that I would be incapable of determining whether the two sequential time slices that I perceived belong to the same space-time worm, in which case there would be transtemporal identity, or if there were two worms that had interchanged for one another in between my first and second experiences of the time slices in question. An extension of this problem of overlapping worms is that it may even be possible that at any one time, a particular object being perceived is composed of spatially identical time slices from any number of fused space-time worms; it seems unclear as to whether or not this would be a case of perceiving one object, or of perceiving many spatio-temporally coincident objects, and I do not believe the perdurantists provide sufficient means for determining this matter.

Ultimately, the introduction of worm merging (as accepted in Heller’s conclusions and explored to some depth above) apparently enables one to explode the notion of continuity under perdurantism by simply hypothesizing a multiplicity of similar, successive (or fused) space-time worms. It might be argued that a god’s eye point of view would be capable of distinguishing between space-time worms and could keep track of whether or not transtemporal identity is maintained, but as mere humans would not be privy to such a point of view, such a response would not serve to enable perdurantists to escape their current predicament, nor allow us to have any hope for grounding transtemporal identity in experiences.

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So then, Heller’s argument does apparently raise a few issues that the endurantist must face if their theory is to hold on to its grasp of explanatory value, and further still it seems that the only hope for maintaining a theory of transtemporal identity lies in the theories of the endurantists because the problems discovered within perdurantist theory seem to be far too problematic to be simply resolved. Fortunately, there have been a number of endurantist responses to Heller’s argument that have sought to undermine the force of his attack. The responses all vary in the way in which they avoid dodging the contradiction that Heller attempts to press upon them, and as such, shall be treated in turn.

The first response I shall address comes from endurantists of the strictest sort, the camp of the mereological essentialists. The mereological essentialism theorists

…deny that objects can remain identical through a change in their parts. They hold onto the…the view that whatever parts a thing has, it has essentially or necessarily. These endurantists take persistence through time to involve the numerical identity of a thing existing at one time with a thing existing at another; and while they concede that it is possible for a things to remain identical through many kinds of change, they deny that it is possible for a thing to survive the loss of any of its parts. (Loux, 241)

Thus, the mereological essentialist can evade the contradiction by making the claim that Descartes simply does not survive the amputation, that something else is there, but it is not Descartes. Thus, since Descartes is destroyed in the process of the amputation, but Descartes(-) survives, it simply cannot be logically argued that they are one and the same person. As Loux points out, however, this response to Heller’s claim immediately raises cautionary flags, as if all parts of a person are necessary, the loss of the smallest particulate subunit of one’s body means the certain destruction of said person (if one holds on to bodily identity), or at least the destruction of one’s body and the creation or survival of something different. Further, this view seems highly unlikely to survive in its current form, for the chemical skeletons of the universe are far from stable or static as modern science shows us, and it is highly improbable that any object will not undergo many losses and gains of particulate parts, especially in the case of living systems.

In order to provide some sort of hope for the mereological take on the matter at hand, Roderick Chisholm attempts to make a linguistic distinction between what we mean by the ‘same’ thing. Chisholm claims that there is a critical distinction between our colloquial, “loose and popular” use of the ‘sameness’ relationship, and the regimented, “strict and philosophical” sense (Loux, 241). Under Chisholm’s take on things, we are capable of making colloquial reference to continuity of objects unproblematically, because the world is actually comprised of primary entities (things in the “strict and philosophical sense”) that are subject to destruction-by-change, but our conceptions of the world are based on the successions of primary entities that result from these changes, the primary entities that are constantly coming into being as a change destroys what was once in a certain place. We can apply general terms, using the colloquial sense of ‘same’ to create the idea of continuity of said objects. So the reason that the paper upon which this dogreat timesent is written remains the same paper as it is exposed to indiscernible chemical and physical changes is simply because the reader is linking the succession of papers that is undergoing the process of destruction and creation together with the non-specific, “loose and popular” referent term ‘paper’, or ‘the paper upon which this dogreat timesent is written’, not because the piece of paper is surviving any of the miniscule changes it is subjected to. Given this particular understanding of mereological essentialism, Chisholm then goes on to make the claim that there is no problem with mereological essentialism and transtemporal identity; quite simply, he proposes, there is some microscopic, unchangeable constant that really is the person that endures through time, some thing that is not the body or the brain or psychological states (Loux, 242).

Some of the problems with the mereological treatment of the issue of transtemporal identity are readily apparent. First and foremost, Chisholm seems to bring any who would side with him straight back into a Dualist framework, though Chisholm would claim that instead of a soul, the object that persists without change and grants identity to a person is some microscopic, undiscovered thing. Regardless, the problem seems to bring us out of the realm of empiricism, stretching further than it may be safe to extrapolate. Another particularly vexing issue for the mereological essentialists is that most people have a strong tendency to suspect that a change can be survived or endured, that such minor alterations as an exchange of an electron or the loss of a hair would not entirely destroy one’s body and replace it with something new. It seems that for a person to endure through time under the mereological framework, one would have to accept that there must be an infinite number of things being destroyed and coming into existence at all times, seemingly overcomplicating the whole process of existence. It seems, yet again pre-philosophically, that it would be much simpler to just posit that things can endure change, and not to require the slightest disturbance to result in the complete erasure of a thing and subsequent manifestation of something almost exactly like it.

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A perhaps more interesting problem with the mereological response to Heller’s argument is that the theory is problematically similar to perdurantism. While on the one hand, the perdurantists have individual, four-dimensional time slices aggregating to form a single, transtemporally identical space-time worm, on the other hand, the mereological essentialists have a succession of primary entities aggregating to form a chain of successive entities which, under a colloquial “loose” term, enables one to pick out the transtemporal identity (rather, ‘sameness’) of a ‘thing’. There is something that seems to stand out here, something that makes me suspect that the time slices of the perdurantist do not really differ in any appreciably substantial way in its constitution from the mereological construction. Both theories rely on aggregations of instantaneous parts of a larger whole to enable some form of transtemporal identity; the main difference is simply that the perdurantists will propose that a thing is never wholly present at any given time (unless its worm is of instantaneous time length), while the mereological essentialist will argue that the instantaneous object is wholly present, and the successive chain of similar objects is simply the method for endurance. Bascically, the difference seems almost negligible, and given the problems immediately above, as well as the problems discussed earlier concerning perdurantism, it seems like mereological essentialism holds little hope for saving the endurantist claims of transtemporal identity.

Another putative method for escaping the problem posed by Heller’s argument is perhaps more promising; I have in mind Peter Geach’s denial of the existence of a single, universal type of numerical identity. According to Loux,

…Geach…claims that sentences of the form ‘a is the same as b’ lack a complete sense or meaning. To give such sentences a complete meaning, we need an answer to the question ‘Same what?’ And Geach claims that an answer to that question always requires the appeal to a kind-term or a count-noun…For Geach, every such answer points to a unique identity relation…it is possible for a thing, a, and a thing, b, to enter into the identity relation determined by one kind-concept, but to fail to enter into the identity relation determined by another kind-concept even though the latter kind applies both to a and b. (Loux, 244)

Under Geach’s paradigm then, it becomes possible to convert Heller’s argument to be more precise, enabling the Geachian endurantist to avoid the contradiction. To the Geachian, the argument becomes something like the following:

(I) Descartes at t1 is numerically identical with Descartes at t2; They are the same person

(II) Descartes(-) at t1 is numerically identical with Descartes(-) at t2; they are the same matter (or clump of matter)

(III) Descartes at t2 is numerically identical with Descartes(-) at t2; they are the same matter (or clump of matter)

(IV) Descartes(-) at t1 is NOT numerically identical with Descartes at t1; transitivity of identity cannot operate here, because it is applying transitivity to different kinds of identity.

(V) Descartes(-) at t1 is not numerically identical with Descartes at t1 by the

true Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals.

It becomes evident here, under Geach’s understanding of identity, that by carefully specifying what type of identity relationship is being investigated, one can negate the problem raised by Heller and soundly defeat the attempt at forcing the endurantist into a contradiction. Another aspect of Geach’s paradigm that appears somewhat appealing is that I posit that the Geachian framework might be able to handle change in parts (or personality traits, etc.). Since not all parts of a person are essential under Geach’s paradigm, it seems unproblematic to suggest that so long as some certain types of identity conditions are met over time, a person could undergo some certain drastic changes but still maintain transtemporal identity. Whether there is some critical set of specific types of identity conditions that must be met, or some sort of equilibrium that must be maintained, I cannot see any logic for at precluding the possibility, and this additional putative functionality would even further bring Geach’s paradigm into agreement with some pre-philosophical notions of transtemporal identity.

There are two commonly raised problems with Geach’s view: it is problematic because it divests philosophers of the notion of a singular, universal identity condition that some argue is necessary, and it may be interpreted by some to suggest that spatially coincident physical objects can exist and are unproblematic. I would suggest, however, that in neither case is the problem so severe as to merit the outright abandonment of Geach’s view; unlike the perdurantist or mereological view, no grand flaw is immediately available for dismantling Geach’s framework. In fact, I suggest that there is a pre-philosophical inclination to believe that there are different types of identity, that there is an important distinction between asking if ‘Clark Kent and Superman are the same person’ and asking if ‘Clark Kent and Superman are the same type of person’. To respond to the camp that suggests Geach’s view leads us to have to accept spatially coincident objects, I refer to my earlier treatment of Heller’s undesirable alternative Log in to see images!, or the problem of arbitrary undetached parts. If one simply rejects the counter-intuitive view that all of me except for my left hand is an object that is distinct from all of me, and instead accepts the more commonsense notion that all of me except for my left hand is simply a fraction of the whole me, Geach’s treatment of the argument simply cannot lead one into a problem with having spatially coincident objects. Further, consideration of the problems elucidated above for the other putative solutions to Heller’s argument makes me suspect that perdurantism or mereological essentialism would get closer to allowing for spatially coincident objects than Geach’s framework allows.

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The only major problem I do believe may prove problematic for Geach will be the matter of parsing every ‘same as’ or ‘identical to’ relationship in order to determine what kind of identity is being invoked; it seems to me that there may be an untenable number of different types of identity that might be posited or argued for, and it may become a grave epistemological problem to attempt to index, sort, and successfully understand and deploy each type of identity correctly and for all cases in which identity is invoked. If this problem proves to be embedded in truth, at the least the Geach approach seems to provide a better starting point for the endurantist to theorize from. This problem, unlike the other major problems outlined above, does have another advantage as well; it seems that at least in this case, one can remain an empiricist and still attempt to solve this particular problem with no quirky deviations from the empiricist principle.

If one is inclined to be skeptical of Geach’s solution to Heller’s contradiction, there are still more hopes available for the endurantist. Trenton Merricks provides us with a system for erasing the problem entirely. Basically, Merricks’ seeks out a means for re-analyzing the use of referring terms in sentences that are putative cases of transtemporal identity in such a way as to allow for actual change, as well as to avoid arguments that raise problems like Heller’s (Merricks, 368-369). The heart of Merricks’ analysis is that all identity conditions are temporally bound, with a specific manner of parsing the referring term. Basically, the theory suggests that some object O that exists at one time is identical to itself existing at another time in a manner that might be similar to a bare substrate, with properties that can be attributed to O as a function of the time t that is present. The overarching goal of the Merricks theory is to enable statements pertaining to personal identity through time to be possible, even with changes in parts, traits, or properties. By the object having certain parts, properties, etc., at some present time, and not in general, the theory strips these properties from the conditions of identity. This then allows for a seemingly bare object to persist through time.

The nature of Merricks’ persistence of transtemporal identity, in being somewhat similar to the idea of bare particulars (in that the parts/properties become unnecessary for endurance/existence) lends itself to some of the same problems faced by bare particulars. It becomes difficult to envision to what extent a thing can survive change, yet still endure through time. Further, it becomes less clear as to what exactly does endure through time; something ephemeral like a soul, something material but undiscovered or indiscernible as per Chisholm’s notions, something else entirely? The aims of Merricks are certainly valuable, but it just seems that the particular deployment is unclear as it stands.

Yet another, albeit much simpler, argument against Heller’s critique is that the history of the objects in question matters. What distinguishes Descartes from Descartes(-) is simply that the two different things have two different histories at time t2, namely that Descartes underwent an amputation, whereas Descartes(-) did not. Some posit that this difference in history is enough to distinguish the two objects from eachother, but depending on how we treat the existence of Descartes and Descartes(-) before the surgery, we may not be able to parse this difference empirically. If they are spatially coincident, distinct objects, we simply cannot physically tell them apart at any time and thus cannot empirically attribute a history to either after the operation, while if Descartes(-) is simply an arbitrary undetached part of Descartes, the amputation is what would separate the two into different entities by differentiating their histories.

In the end, Heller’s argument against endurantism appears to serve to better hone distinctions between types of endurantism, and allow philosophers to select the more promising theories from the more problematic. While Heller’s original intention was to argue for perdurantist theory against endurantist theory, the problems that are inherent in perdurantist theory simply seem to grave to overcome simply, and in general it appears that Ockham’s Razor can be liberally applied to many parts of perdurantist theory. Though the argument Heller puts forward is certainly challenging for the endurantist theorists, the exercise in avoiding the logical contradiction entailed in the argument proves useful for testing the waters of mereological essentialism (including Chisholm’s prescription of it), Geach’s idea of multiple types of identity, Merricks’ notion of what I suggest is bare identity, and that history can distinguish objects. Ultimately, I endorse Geach’s take on the problem, as his view seems to be capable of both defeating Heller’s contradiction and encompbuming a number of pre-philosophical notions concerning transtemporal identity that have strong intuitive grab and provide useful mechanism for explaining how things like change are possible without negating transtemporal identity.

Citations

1. Loux, Michael. Metaphysics. Routledge, 1998.

2. Heller, Mark. “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects.” Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 1998.

3. Merricks, Trenton. “Endurance and Indiscernibility.” Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 1998.

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ALSO A male reproductive organSUCKING ****WAD

tl;dr: SPACE-TIME WORMS ARE A SRZ BIZNESS IN PHILOSOPHY STORIES

Log in to see images! DOPE-HARDCORE-0 edited this message on 06/22/2008 12:20PM

Tangolho

Avatar: Tangolho's Avatar
4

[Team Shortbus]

Level 24 Troll

The Repeater

Something_witty will love this one

Btw, I didnt wrote this…

“John Freeman who was Gordon Freemans brother was one day in an office typing on a computer. He got an email from his brother that said that aliens and monsters were attacking his place and aksed him for help so he went.

John Freeman got his computer shut down and wet on the platform to go up to the roof of the building where he left his motorcycle and normal people close because he was in his office lab coat. John Freeman got on his motorcycl and said “its time for me to live up to my family name and face full life consequences” so he had to go.

John Freeman ramped off the building and did a backflip and landed. He kept driving down the road and made sure there was no zombies around because he ddint have weapon.

The contrysides were nice and the plants were singing and the birds and the sun was almost down from the top of the sky. the mood was set for John Freemans quest to help his brother where he was. John Freeman looked around the countrysides and said “its a good day to do what has to be done by me and help my brother to defeat the enemys”.

John Freeman was late so he had to drive really fast. A cop car was hiden near by so when John Freeman went by the cops came and wanted to give him a ticket. Here John Freeman saw the first monster because the cop was posessed and had headcrabs.

“I cant give you my lisense officer” John Freeman said

“Why not?” said the headcrab oficer back to John Freeman.

“Because you are headcrab zombie” so John Freeman shot the oficer in the head and drove off thinking “my brother is in trouble there” and went faster.

John Freeman had to go faster like the speed of sound and got there fast because Gordon needed him where he was. John Freeman looked at road signs and saw “Ravenholm” with someons writing under it saying “u shudnt come here” so John Freeman almost turned around but heard screaming like Gordon so he went faster again.

John Freeman drove in and did another flip n jumped off his motorbike and the motor bike took out some headcrab zombies infront of John Freeman. John Freeman smiled and walked fast. John Freeman then looked on the ground and found wepon so he pickd it up and fired fast at zombie goasts in front of a house.

John Freeman said “Zombie goasts leave this place” and the zombie goasts said “but this is our house” and John Freeman felt sorry for them becaus they couldnt live there anymore because they were zombie goasts so he blew up the house and killed the zombie goasts so they were at piece.

Then John Freeman herd another scream from his brother so he kept walking really faster to get where he was. Ravenholdm was nothing like the countrysides there was no birds singing and the pants were dead and teh dirt was messy and bloody from headcrabs.

When John Freeman got to where the screaming was started from he found his brother Gorden Freeman fightin the final bosss and Gordon said “John Freeman! Over here!” so John Freeman went there to where Gordon Freeman was fighting. John Freeman fired his bullet from teh gun really fast and the bullets went and shot the final boss in the eyes and the final boss couldnt see.

Gordon Freeman said “its time to end this ones and for all!” and punched the final boss in the face and the final boss fell. John Freeman said “thanks i could help, bro” and Gordon Freeman said “you should come here earlier next time” and they laughed.

The laughed overed quickly though because John Freeman yelled “LOOK OUT BRO!” and pointed up to the top of the sky. Gordon Freeman looked up and said “NOO! John Freeman run out of here fast as you can!” and John Freeman walked real fast out.

John Freeman loked back and saw Gordon get steppd on by the next boss and he was mad and angry.

“I’ll get you back evil boss!” John Freeman yelled at the top of lungs.

to be continued..?”

CrinkzPipe

Avatar: 35643 2015-02-20 21:59:22 -0500
10

[Harem and Sushi Bar]

Level 62 Emo Kid

Hi, I'm an adult whos into bumes. But not boners!

Tangolho Posted:

Something_witty will love this one

Btw, I didnt wrote this…

“John Freeman who was Gordon Freemans brother was one day in an office typing on a computer. He got an email from his brother that said that aliens and monsters were attacking his place and aksed him for help so he went.

John Freeman got his computer shut down and wet on the platform to go up to the roof of the building where he left his motorcycle and normal people close because he was in his office lab coat. John Freeman got on his motorcycl and said “its time for me to live up to my family name and face full life consequences” so he had to go.

John Freeman ramped off the building and did a backflip and landed. He kept driving down the road and made sure there was no zombies around because he ddint have weapon.

The contrysides were nice and the plants were singing and the birds and the sun was almost down from the top of the sky. the mood was set for John Freemans quest to help his brother where he was. John Freeman looked around the countrysides and said “its a good day to do what has to be done by me and help my brother to defeat the enemys”.

John Freeman was late so he had to drive really fast. A cop car was hiden near by so when John Freeman went by the cops came and wanted to give him a ticket. Here John Freeman saw the first monster because the cop was posessed and had headcrabs.

“I cant give you my lisense officer” John Freeman said

“Why not?” said the headcrab oficer back to John Freeman.

“Because you are headcrab zombie” so John Freeman shot the oficer in the head and drove off thinking “my brother is in trouble there” and went faster.

John Freeman had to go faster like the speed of sound and got there fast because Gordon needed him where he was. John Freeman looked at road signs and saw “Ravenholm” with someons writing under it saying “u shudnt come here” so John Freeman almost turned around but heard screaming like Gordon so he went faster again.

John Freeman drove in and did another flip n jumped off his motorbike and the motor bike took out some headcrab zombies infront of John Freeman. John Freeman smiled and walked fast. John Freeman then looked on the ground and found wepon so he pickd it up and fired fast at zombie goasts in front of a house.

John Freeman said “Zombie goasts leave this place” and the zombie goasts said “but this is our house” and John Freeman felt sorry for them becaus they couldnt live there anymore because they were zombie goasts so he blew up the house and killed the zombie goasts so they were at piece.

Then John Freeman herd another scream from his brother so he kept walking really faster to get where he was. Ravenholdm was nothing like the countrysides there was no birds singing and the pants were dead and teh dirt was messy and bloody from headcrabs.

When John Freeman got to where the screaming was started from he found his brother Gorden Freeman fightin the final bosss and Gordon said “John Freeman! Over here!” so John Freeman went there to where Gordon Freeman was fighting. John Freeman fired his bullet from teh gun really fast and the bullets went and shot the final boss in the eyes and the final boss couldnt see.

Gordon Freeman said “its time to end this ones and for all!” and punched the final boss in the face and the final boss fell. John Freeman said “thanks i could help, bro” and Gordon Freeman said “you should come here earlier next time” and they laughed.

The laughed overed quickly though because John Freeman yelled “LOOK OUT BRO!” and pointed up to the top of the sky. Gordon Freeman looked up and said “NOO! John Freeman run out of here fast as you can!” and John Freeman walked real fast out.

John Freeman loked back and saw Gordon get steppd on by the next boss and he was mad and angry.

“I’ll get you back evil boss!” John Freeman yelled at the top of lungs.

to be continued..?”

Most orignal story I’ve ever seen.

CrinkzPipe edited this message on 06/22/2008 12:16PM

DOPE-HARDCOR-
E-0

Avatar: DOPE-HARDCORE-0's Avatar
2

[Team Shortbus]

Level 37 Troll

ALSO A male reproductive organSUCKING ****WAD

Once upon a time I was a space-time worm that was travelling forward through 4-D space. I encountered another space-time worm that was all of me except for my left hand, and he said “Hey baby, we’re numerically identical according to some” so I ****ed the hole in his arm where his hand was supposed to be. It wasn’t gay though because we were the same person, so it was like jacking it, but less sad because I was penetrating someone that wasn’t me.

InaneAnomaly

Avatar: InaneAnomaly's Avatar
2

Level 22 Troll

“Dick in a Box”

Once upon a time there was a little girl called May.

May was a very good girl, and always listened to what her mother said. Unfortunately for May, her mother was a drunken crack-whore, and so most things she told her daughter to do were not good for her to say the least.

One day, May was on her way back from the corner store where she’d stolen some smokes and cheap booze for her mother as she’d been instructed to do, when she saw a large, black cat sitting on a wall. The cat was staring directly at her, it’s eyes cloudy and bloodshot. May turned away and continued on her way back home, trying to shake the thought of the strange cat from her head. She’d never seen the cat around before, and wondered where it could have come from.

As she made her way down the street though, she got a strange feeling, as though someone was watching her. She turned to look around and saw the cat, sitting on the corner of the wall at the end of the street, staring at her. A shiver ran down her spine and she turned away once more, picking up the pace as she continued down the street.

As she reached the end of the road, she turned the corner, glancing back to see if the cat was still watching. To her horror, not only was the cat still staring at her, but it had moved to sit on a fence halfway down the street. May broke out into a run as she turned to corner, and increased in speed even more as she went down the street. Every now and then she’d look back, and every time she saw the cat, staring right into her eyes, following her down the streets.

Eventually, after running a few blocks, May looked back and saw that the cat was no longer following her. She stopped, panting heavily as she tried to regain her breath. Perhaps it had all been in her head, and the cat was just making it’s way back home slowly and found an interest in her since she was the only other thing around, so it had watched her? Either way, it didn’t matter now; the cat was gone, and she was only two blocks away from the broken down apartment block where she and her mother lived.

Having caught her breath, May began to walk slowly down the street. She no longer felt the strange sensation that someone else’s eyes were upon her. Sadly though, this did not last long.

As she turned the corner to walk down the street to her apartment, she felt the presence of the horrid cat once more. She froze, slowly turning her head to look over her shoulder. The cat wasn’t there though. Maybe she’s just been imagining it? She was a little jumpy after all.

She turned to walk the last short distance to her home, but as she did so she was horrified to see the cat, sitting on the wall just outside her apartment block. She tried to tell herself that it was just a cat, that there was nothing to be afraid of, but she felt a strange aura around this creature. It was disturbing.

She gritted her teeth and and bravely stepped forwards, walking towards her apartment. She walked up to the cat… and past it. It did nothing. She stood only a few feet away from it now. The apartment doors were so close. But May couldn’t help but feel the urge to turn back around and take one last look at the cat.

She turned to face it. It was still staring off in the direction it had been before. It was only now that it occurred to her for the first time, that maybe the cat’s eyes were the way they were because it was blind. Maybe it hadn’t even been watching her all this time, but had just been staring off ahead of itself because it had nothing to look at.

She took a step forwards toward the cat. Something felt like it was drawing her in, and despite her best judgement, she reached out to place a hand upon it’s head.

Her fingertips were only inches away from the animal’s head when it turned suddenly to face her. She jumped and pulled her hand back. The cat narrowed it’s eyes, and slowly, everything around her began to turn black. The whole city was disappearing into nothingness. She dropped her bag, a bottle rolling out along the pavement and becoming engulfed by the spreading shadows. They moved closer to her, and the cat opened it’s mouth, revealing a red vortex in the back of it’s throat. She let out a scream, and in a moment, the shadows had swallowed her.

______________________________________

May awoke in what seemed like a garage. It was dark, only a single light bulb overhead, swinging gently back and forth. She tried to move her hand to shield her eyes as it flashed across her face, but found that she was unable to move her arms. She turned her head only to find that she was tied up; her wrists and her ankles tied to a table.

“Ah, so you are finally awake, young one?” Came a calm, deep voice. She tried to look but the light from the bulb blinded her.

“What…what’s going on? Where am I?”

“Calm yourself child.” A being that looked like the cat came to stand beside her. But it was different now, taller, it’s head was bigger. It placed a paw upon her arm, and to her horror, it had fingers. It wasn’t a paw at all, it was a hand. A shade was placed around the light bulb, and she saw that it was not the same cat. It’s eyes were yellow, and it appeared to be much younger. She looked down to it’s hand, only to find that the creature was wearing clothes. It had the body of a human, and was the size of a fully grown man.

“Who are you?!” She cried, staring at the hideous creature in disgust. “What are you?!”

“I cannot tell you my name, little one,” came the cat’s reply, “My name is impossible for a human to understand. You do not have the vocal chords to speak it yourself, why, the mere mention of it would cause your head to explode.”

“But… I don’t understand,” came her trembling voice. “Why am I here?”

Suddenly lights flickered on all around her. She was in an enormous room filled with hooded figures, and there, sitting on a throne slightly uplifted from the ground, was the cat she’d seen in the street. It was now also anthropomorphic, and wearing a long cloak and a crown. It’s cold, dead eyes stared at her, and it lifted it’s sceptre. The creatures removed their hoods. They were all different sorts of hideous anthropomorphic animals; cats, dogs, foxes, horses, squirrels; all manner of urban animals.

“Now,” said the cat that stood beside her, “it is time for the initiation process. Get into your groups!” The animals shifted and moved around, gathering into groups with one another. “Group one, begin.” The cat lowered his head and held out an arm in invitation to them, backing slowly into the shadows beside the throne.

A large horse creature stepped forwards. He looked down at her. He only had tiny pupils, a large portion of the whites of his eyes showing. His nostrils flared as he bent down, taking in the scent of the young girl. She whimpered and recoiled as best she could. The horse lifted his gaze to hers. “Why, ain’t you a sweet little thing? There won’t be much left of you once I’ve had my way.”

Tears began to stream from her eyes as the horse stepped back, grasping the robe he wore and removing it in one feel swoop. May screamed in unbridled* terror as she stared at the huge, throbbing member of the monstrous being before her.

A fox from the crowd thrust a fist in the air and called out “YIFF!” The rest of the hoard immediately began to chant “YIFF! YIFF! YIFF! YIFF!” A large grin spread over the horse’s grotesque face and it took a step forwards. “Now honey, it’ll probably hurt more if y’ fight it… but by all means, go right ahead and scream and thrash as much as you want. You resistance will only make my male reproductive organ harder.**”

Eyes wide and pouring with tears, May stared up into the evil eyes of the horse. As he leaned down, she caught a glimpse over his shoulder of the cat overlord on his thrown. The corners of his lips curved slightly into a small smile, and she knew it was over for her.

_____________________________________________

-THE END?-

*You see what I did there? Bridle? Horse? Oh ho ho. I didn’t even notice.

**Obligatory.

Yeah, I just made this **** up as I went along. I don’t even know what it is. THIS IS HOW BORED I TRULY AM. Log in to see images! ENJOY!

Perhaps I should continue this with how they turn her into a furry or a slave…or both… or some ****. Perhaps…it is best left alone as it is. A STEAMING PILE OF HORRIFIC ****.

OH AND I DIDN’T PROOF READ THIS **** BECAUSE IT’S HONESTLY NOT ****ING WORTH IT, SO ENJOY THE BAD EVERYTHING.

This is truly how much time I have on my pitiful hands. Also, Log in to see images!

Edit: k lol, fix’d a couple things I just noticed fer the hell o’ it.

InaneAnomaly edited this message on 06/22/2008 7:00PM
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